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132 BArLEY v. CouxTY Los Axar:r~Es 
A. 23659. In Bank. 
RAY A. BAILEY et al., 
LOS ANGELES 
[1] Zoning- Amendment- Compliance With Statutory Require-
ments.-Gov. § 
of 
ordinance were transmitted 
with letter 
ments had been approved the 
copy of the notice of public 
that such hearing was held, and a list of the persons who 
since it will he presumed from the recommendation 
in the absence of evidence to the that the 
commission found that the proposNI ordinance was necessary 
for the general public welfare and interest. 
[2] !d.-Judicial Remedies-AppeaL-In an action to dedare in-
valid an amendment of county zoning where 
affidavits produced by defendant contradicted those plain-
tiffs averring that the subject of a juvenile hall was not 
discussed at a public hearing held by the planning commission, 
a question of fact was raised, and the trial court's determina-
tion will not he disturbed on appeal. 
[3] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Evidence to Support 
Orders.--An appellate court will not disturb implied findings 
of fact made by the trial court in support of an any 
more than it will interfere with express findings on -which a 
final judgment is predicated. 
[4] !d.-Presumptions-Evidence to Support Orders.-When evi-
dence is conflicting, it will he presumed that the court found 
every fact necessary to support its ordPr that the evidence 
would justify. 
[5] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Character of Evidence.-So 
far as the trial court has passed on the of conflicting 
evidence, its implied findings arc conclusive, and this rule is 
equally applicable •vhether the evidence is oral or 
[6] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Evidence is Docu-
mentary.-vVhen an issue is tried the rule on 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp., Zoning, 
-~ 169 ct seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7, 8] Zoning, §5; [2] Zoning, §7; 
[3] Appeal and Error, § 1298; [4] Appeal and Error, ~ 1165; 
[fi] Appeal and Error,~ 1287; [6] Appeal and Error,§ 1299; [9] 
Counties, §91; [10] Zoning, §2(2). 
eontl'lllion of the 
stnit•d therein and all 
may be inferred and where 
eonl!i(·t in the fads the trial 
of the contron;rted facts will not be 
111 a 
to the conuui::;sion for n report 
report be illed with the if a 
i~ considered in 
hy the 
<:OJlilliis.sion ratlH'l' than an entirely new subject matter 
nurl initinted by the legislative body (Gov. Code, 
G:iG")7), the applicable statute does not require a 
by the planning commission after 
body of the proposed change in the 
rec:oumll'!lded ordinance to the planning commission. (Dis-
to the conir;1ry in Joli11ston v. BoaJ'd of 
:n Cd.2d GG, 187 P.2d 686.) 
Id.-Amendment-Public Hearing.-The words used by a 
(•ommission in an approved amendment of a 
ordiu::mee that pl'nperty in any residPntial district may 
usc:d for "governmental uses of any kind" are broad enough 
encompass use of lnnd for a juvenile hall. 
19 Counties-Ordinances-Time of Taking Effect.-If the urgency 
ordinance was enacted without legisla-
( see Gov. Code, § 2:3123; Elec. Code, § 16:31), 
yoid and of no but this does not invalidate the 
hdanee of the ordinance which would take effect at the 
tinw appointed by law. 
[10 of Ordinance.-A proposeu county ordi-
whieh woulu amend the basic zoning ordinance to permit 
property to he used for governmental purposes 
i :· "nc·h m<es are dePmed advisable and benefieial to the general 
wPlfare is not special legislation favoring one class. 
)E~\L from an order of the Snperior Court of Los 
YaeatiJJg a temporary restraining order, 
preliminary iHjnndion and discharging an order to 
Arnold l'ra('g·rr, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Tarr, Car-ter & 0 'Neill, \V. Sumner Holbrook, 
Fralleis II. 0 '-'\ eill, for App('llants. 
\\T. Kennedy, County Counsel, Edwar<l H. Gaylord 
S. Davis, Deputy Couuty Counsel, for Respondents. 
, ~was zoned 1{-1 for use. 
of'fieials desired to locate a hall in the l{aneho Los 
area, but in order to do so it was neeessary to amend 
the basic ordinanee of the 
'l'he controlling proee,lure to be followed in 
an ordinance is found in the Government 
65500-65805. 
amending such 
s<~etions 
Section 65804 provides: ''Except as otherwise provided in 
this article, an amendment to a zoning ordinance -which amend-
ment changes any property from one zone to another or 
imposes any regulation listed in Section 65800 not thereto-
fore imposed or removes or modifies any such regulation 
theretofore imposed shall be initiated and adopted in the 
same manner as required for the initiation and adoption of 
the original zoning ordinance.'' 
Seetion 65650 provides: ''Before reeommending a preeise 
plan or regulation to the legislative body or any amendment 
to it, for adoption, the planning eommission shall hold at 
least one publie hearing." 
On July 27, 1954, pursuant to seetion 65651, the reg-ional 
planning eommission gave 10 days' published notiee that a 
publie hearing would be held relative to reeommending to 
the board of supervisors eertain amendments to the zoning 
ordinanee. At the publie hearing on ,July 27, 1954, the 
proposed amendments were diseussed. One of these amend-
ments proposed that property in any residential zone might 
be used for any governmental purpose if a permit were first 
obtained in aeeordance with established proeedures. 
On August 18, 1954, the planning commission transmitted 
to the board of supervisors its recommendation of the pro-
posed amendments together with copies thereof, a copy of 
the notiee of hearing, and a list of the persons who testified 
at the hearing. 
Section 65654 provides that the legislative body may adopt 
the plan proposed by the commission by ordinance or resolu-
tion, but must first hold at least one publiG hearing. Upon 
receipt of the proposed amendments the board of supervisors 
135 
met at 9 a.m. 
ordinance which would 
hall 
prove that such use would not 
, or welfarr. This 
ordinance was then forwarded to the planning 
which was in session a short distance away. ·while 
the board was still sitting a communication was received 
the planning commission. This communication 
that the commission had considered and approved 
ordinance. The proposed ordinance was read 
members of the public present and approximately 15 
thereafter the board ordered that the public hearing 
in the matter of the proposed amendments to the 
ordinance to permit governmental use of property in 
any zone after a permit was obtained. The board then passed 
the amendments which related only to juvenile halls, and later 
made application to the rrgional planning commission for a 
permit to use the Rancho r~os Amigos land for a 
l1all. A hearing date was set and notice of hearing 
but prior to the time set for the hearing plaintiffs, 
property owners protesting the amendments, insti-
tuted this action and the superior court issued an order 
the holding of the meeting pending the hearing 
order to show cause. At the hearing of the order to 
cause, the restraining order was vacated and the pre-
injunction denied. This appeal followed. 
Plaintiffs contend first that section 63653 of the Gov-
r:rnment Code, which requires a "report of findings, sum-
maries of hearings, and recommendations of the planning 
'' was not complied with and that such section is 
In the instant case, copies of the proposed amend-
to the ordinance \Yere transmitted by the commission 
board with a letter slating that the proposed amend-
had been approw<l by the commission. There was 
also copy of thr pnblisherl notiee of the pnblic hearing, a 
staJ,~ment that sneh hPRring had been held, and a list of the 
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persons ~who there testified. 
in Cantrell Boa1·d 
[197 P.2d , >Yhere the 
contention that two 
) that it shall transmit '""""" 
transmit recommendations. That 
'' 'After consideration of all the 
mony at the 
that the of the 
nwntal to the llealth and welfare 
the recommendation to 
be revoked. 
''The language must be held to that the 
commission had found that detriment and 
and general welfare of the community ensued from the oper-
ation of the hog ranch in question. And in conneetion with 
the action of such eommission and board, usually 
of laymen, the fact that a certain aetion is taken or recom-
mendation made raises the presumption that the existence of 
the necessary facts had been ascertained anu found. (Bm·-
tholomae Oil Corp. v. Seager, 35 Cal.App.2d 77, 80 P.2d 
614] ; Lindell Co. v. Boarcl of Pm·mit 23 Cal.2d 303, 
323 [144 P.2d 4]; North Side etc. Assn. v. Cmtnfy Los 
Angeles, 70 Cal.App.2d 598, 608, 609 [161 P.2d 613] .) We 
cannot perceive ~wherein appellant has been prejudiced by 
the absence of formal findings under the facts here '' 
The only finding \Yhieh could here have been made was that 
the proposed ordinance was necessary for tlw public 
welfare and interest. Since there is nothing to the eontrary 
in the record before us, this findi11g may be from 
the recommendation made (Swm·s v. Council of of 
ValleJo, 88 Cal.2d 867, 872 [206 P.2d 353] ). 
Plaintiffs next contend that the ordinanee relating 
only to juvmile halls enacted by the legislatiYe bod~, ~was a 
new and different ordinanee than the anwndments recom-
mended by the planning commission and that it therefore 
should have been subject, under the of section 
65657,'~ to a public hearing held by the planning commission. 
Defenrlants, on the other hand, contend that the following 
*''The legislative body shall first ref or such proposal to establish such 
precise plan or regulation to the planning commission for report. 
Before making a report the planning commission shall hold at least 
one public hearing in the same manner as heretofore prescribed in this 
artiele." (Gov. Code, § 65657.) 
COT'XTY OJ<' Los 
[46 C.2d 132; 293 P.2d 4491 
137 
make 
or amend-
commission until 
the planning com-
lms been filed 
§ 65655.) Defend-
hall comes ·within the puniew of 
amenr1meut--a ''governmental 
that the was referred to the 
its approval thereof. 
is correct, the statute, section 65655, 
a pnblie hearing. Plaintiffs' argument is 
contelH1 that tlw sn bject of a juvenile hall 
considered at the public lwaring held by the planning 
and that the juvenile hall ordinance was a new 
frerent one reqniriug a public hearing under the provi-
siolls of section 65657. [2] In support of their first argu-
rdy upon aftida rits in vYhich it is ayerred that the 
of a juvc!lile l11lll was not t1isc·nssed at the public hear-
c1 the planning eommission. 'rhe affidavits pro-
rlefelldallt:.; are to tlw contr<U"Y. 'l'his vYas a question 
det:ided adwrsely to plaintiffs by the trial court. 
· '..c\n appellate eomt vvillnot disturb the implied findings 
m;HJe by a i rial eourt in support of an order, any more 
it 1rilt interfere 1rith express findings upon which a final 
is pred il:at<•d. [ 4] \\'hen the evidence is conflict-
\ rill be presmned that the eourt found en~ry faet neces-
ro sup port its order that the eviderwe vrould justify. 
far as it has pastied on the 1veight of the evidence, its 
findings are eonclusiYe. This rule is equally applicable 
vdH•tllt·r the lcYidence is oral or documentary." (irlurray v. Su-
44 Cal.2d GJI. 619 [284 P.2d 1] .) [6] "When 
is triecl Oll affld;wits, the rule on appeal is that those 
ailidnxits fayorillg the eontention of the prevailing party 
ish not only the faets stated therein but also all facts 
may be. inferred therefrom, and vrhen tl1ere 
;bstamial umflid ill the facts statefl, the l1etermination 
eontroverted facts by the trial court vvill not be 
" (llayutin v. Rudnick, 115 Oal.App.2d 138, 
P.2d 707]; People Y. Western illeat Co., 13 Cal. 
[110 P. 3:3R I; Jlase!li v. E. II. Appleby & Co., Inc., 
634 12.iG P.2c1 618] ; Jones v. Lindsey, 114 
237 [230 P.2d L:i3]; SchTeibcr v. Hooker, 114 
684 [261 P.2d 55]; Paulekas Y. Paulekas, 117 
138 BAILEY v. CouNTY Ob' Los ANGELES 0.2d 
v. Joint 
Executh·e Board 190 
[255 P.2d .) 
[7] Plaintifrs' setoncl a1·gument that the hall 
ordinance the board a public hearing 
before the planning commission is supported by a statement 
in the case of Johnston v. Board ) , 31 
CaL2d 66 P .2d . There it vvas said 76) : "Before 
any ordinanee is adopted, the loeal planning eommission must 
hold public hearings at whieh interested parties may appear. 
Planning Act, § 5.) A proposed plan is then sub-
mitted to the loeal legislative body, which also holds public 
hearings. Any change in the proposed ordinance nwst be 
submitted to the cornrnisM:on fm· additional 1Jttblic hearings. 
(Ibid. § " (Emphasis added.) The italicized sentence 
in the quotation appears to be incorrect. Section 6 ( Stats., 
] 929, ch. 838, p. 1809) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
"~o change or addition to said master plan, or any part of it 
as adopted by the planning commission, shall be made by the 
legislative body until the said proposed change or addition 
shall have been referred to the planning commission for 
report thereon and an attested copy of said report thereon 
filed with the legislative body by the planning commission . 
. . . "Section 6, Act 5211b (Deering's Gen. Laws, pp. 1773-
177 4) provides also "No change in or addition to the master 
plan or any part thereof, as adopted by the planning com-
mission, shall be made by the legislative body in adopting 
the same until the said proposed change or addition shall have 
been referred to the planning commission for a report thereon 
and an attested copy of such report shall have been filed 
·with the legislative body." The present section 65655, hereto-
fore quoted in full, requires only that the proposed change 
be referred to the planning commission for a report and that 
such report be filed with the legislative body. The legislative 
history of the present section (added by Stats. 1953, ch. 
1355, § 2, based on former § 65334, as added by Stats. 1951, ch. 
8~34, § 1, p. 687: Stats. 1947, ch. 807, § 72, p. 1920: Stats. 
1929, ch. 838, § 6.6, as added by Stats. 1937, ch. 665, § 15, 
p. 1825) shows that if the juvenile hall ordinance in question 
is considered merely as a "change" in an ordinance recom-
mended to the legislative body by the planning commission 
rather than an entirely new subject matter proposed and 
initiated by the legislative body (Gov. Code, § § 65656, 65657) 
at no time has the applicable statute required a further public 
BAILEY v. CouNTY oF Los ANGELES 139 
[48 C.2d 132; 293 P.2d 4491 
commission after by the 
body of the proposed change in the recommended 
--"~n•nnn to planning commission. The crucial question 
whether or not the juvenile hall ordinance is 
><ui"ueLlllLll': new initiated by the legislative body, or whether 
vu•:u•o"" in an amendment to an ordinance pro-
~;uau.uu.5 commiSSIOn. [8] Defendants' argu-
appears the more logical one: that the phrase used by 
11~acnuLu5 commission in the proposed ordinance that prop-
in any residential zone may be nsed for ''governmental 
any kind'' is broad enough to encompass use of the 
for a juvenile hall and that the ordinance passed by 
~;;Lcuuau'"' was merely a part of the whole, or an ordinance 
of lesser scope than that which they might have enacted. It 
therefore, that no further public hearing was required 
held by the planning commission upon receipt of the 
change in the amendment recommended by that 
Anything to the contrary in Johnston v. Board of 
31 Cal.2d 66 [187 P.2d 686], is hereby dis-
'x"""'"a"' also rely on the case of Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 
P.2d 225]. We were there concerned with a different 
We said there, in speaking of the Planning and 
n"''"""'""''<•fi11.n Act (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5211c), that 
legislative body shall not change the plan without 
""r'"""''n the proposed change to the planning commission for 
72) and the planning commission must hold 
hearings on such proposed changes ( § 7 4) '' (emphasis 
; pp. 134, 135). Section 72 is the predecessor of the 
under consideration, 65655, and has been heretofore 
commented upon. Section 74 refers to a change or addition 
master plan initiated by the legislative body. In the 
under consideration, the change in the master plan 
'"'J"""""u, by way of proposed amendments to the ordinance, 
the planning commission, not with the legislative body. 
in the proposed amendment was made by the 
body. Tl1e case of Simpson v. Hite, supra, is there-
inapplicable. 
Plaintiffs contend that the urgency clause of the ordi-
in question was improperly enacted without statutory 
nttlAvrt~r therefor. Plaintiffs section 25123 of the Gov-
Code which provides: ''Except as provided in 
•n:n"'"".n 4, Chapter 2, of the Elections Code, no ordinance 
by the Board shall take effect within less than thirty 
140 BAru:Y 1'. COF:-\TY ore Los 
after its passage." Section 1631 of 
forth the ordinances which 
1·efers to initiative and referendum 
here involved. 
ordinances ... shall become 
date of final passage." 
The urgency of 
and and 
ho\YeYer, does not invalidate the bala11ee of 
In People . Phillips, 76 521 
the court said "Under the rule if no 0mergency 
existed or the urgency declaration were hn-alid that 1vould not 
impair the validity of the remainder of the statute 1vhich 
would take effect at the regnlar time law.'' 
(See also Michelson v. City of 109 
[159 P. 431]; In r·e Hoffman, 155 Cal. 120 [99 P. 517, 
132 Am.St.Hep. 75] ; Morgan v. City of Long Beach, 57 CaL 
App. 134, 139 l207 P. 53]; Klassen v. 110 CaLJ\pp.2d 
539, 543 [243 P.2d 28].) 
[10] There is HO merit to plaintiffs' contention that the 
ordinance invotved here is special favoring one 
class. It is conceded by plaintiffs that the could have 
exempted itself from the provisions of its basic zoning ordi-
nance {see Snnny Slope ·water Co. v. City of 1 Cal. 
2d 87, 98 [33 P.2d 672]; Jardine v. City of 199 
CaL 64, 76 [248 P. 225, 48 A.I1.R. 509]). Since it could 
have exempted itself, there appears to be no souud reason 
why it should be prohibited from amending its basic zoning 
ordinanee to permit residential property to be used for gov-
ernmental purposes if such uses arc deemed advisable and 
benefieial to the general public welfare. 
For the foregoing reasons we conelude that the ordinance 
in question \Hls Yalidly enacted, ·with the exeeption of the 
urgency chmse, and that the order of the trial court Yacating 
the temporary restraining orde·r, denying a preliminary in-
junction and discharging an order to shoy,- cause must be 
affirmed. Because of this conclusion \Ye find it unnecessary to 
consider the argument of defendants that 
entitled to relief by way of injunction. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,T., 'J'rayuor, .J., 
and Me Comb, .J., concurred. 
were not 
,J., 
